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Abstract
What does it mean when we say that computers can ‘write’ and how are recent developments in
neural  networks  and machine  learning  changing  this  capacity?  This  article  examines  the  long-
standing literary fear of authorship being replaced by machines while also interrogating the labour
and credit implications that sit behind widely used structures of authorship in a technological age.
The argument makes reference to one work of computer-generated writing –  Johannes Heldén &
Håkan Jonson’s  Evolution [2014]  – and to  one  software  paradigm (a  character-based recurrent
neural networks for language acquisition trained on the corpus of the journal  Textual Practice). I
here argue that unless we conceive more broadly of the criteria for ‘authorship’ as a labour function,
and unless we take seriously the need to see textual production as social production, hybridized (but
predominantly) machine identities will come to dominate a literary landscape.
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‘Writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs’
– Donna Haraway1
‘The series of temporal inventions of the object is intelligible only afterwards’
 – Recurrent neural network trained on Textual Practice
Even  before  the  advent  and  mass  uptake  of  the  word  processor,  authors  and  publishers  often
imagined their  own erasure at  the hands of machines that can write.  For instance,  as Matthew
Kirschenbaum has recently charted, Stephen King famously penned a story – ‘Word Processor of
the Gods’ – in which the ‘delete’ function of his  computer allows him to erase reality;  a clear
metaphor for a fear of redundancy in the face of the machine’s power.2 William Gibson’s self-
encrypting  (and  therefore  self-erasing)  digital  poem,  Agrippa  (Book  of  the  Dead) [1992],  also
betrays such an anxiety of obsolescence in its  self  undoing. Of all  the functions that  the word
processor introduced, it was ‘cut’, ‘delete’, and ‘execute’ that seemed to cause the loudest noise.
Among the more widely circulated of these fearful  prophecies,  though, is  Roald Dahl’s
imagined ‘Great Automatic Grammatizator’, from his 1953 collection, Someone Like You - a story
that features a machine that quantifies human creativity through the mathematicization of language.
A world away from surrealist  conceptions of ‘automatic’ writing in the early twentieth century,
Dahl’s machine is a dark device akin to an organ that a human operator ‘plays’ with the stops set to
inject the desired sentiment at any point during the unfolding narrative arc. The most important
feature  of  Dahl’s  short  story,  though,  is  the  focus  on  material  textual  production  and  its
remuneration. That is, Dahl recognises that the terror of such a machine is predominantly to do with
the  symbolic  economics  of  authors’ names as  brands;  the ‘author-function’ as  Michel  Foucault
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might term it. In Dahl’s tale, these names are re-minted as coinage within hierarchies of prestige,
akin to those recently explored by James F. English and Ted Underwood.3 Of course, as with all the
symbolic  economies  described  by  Pierre  Bourdieu,  these  virtualised  currencies  map  onto  real
economies  (if,  that  is,  we  can  even  use  the  word  ‘real’ to  describe  an  economy).  As  Dahl’s
protagonist feels his ‘own hand creeping closer and closer to that golden contract’, he asks for the
strength  to  maintain  human  creativity  in  the  face  of  financial  ruin,  a  strength  to  value  an
autonomous art over material circumstances, a strength (expressed with Dahl's customary shock
hyperbole) ‘to let our children starve’, even while it is ambiguous as to whether this text is itself is a
product of the Great Automatic Grammatizator.4
Capital has not quite yet built a technology at this level of competence, so far as we know.
However, it has already devised factory-like environments where many anonymous authors produce
texts under a single name (most notably in recent days, James Patterson) in order to dominate the
literary market. It is also certainly the case that there are definable mathematical (and measurable)
properties of language, the core of Dahl’s machinery. Zipf’s law, for instance, tells us that in any
text,  roughly  speaking,  the  frequency of  each word is  inversely  proportional  to  its  rank in  the
frequency table (put otherwise: the most frequent word occurs roughly twice as frequently as the
next-most frequent,  and so on). We also know, from the work of John Burrows, that a type of
textual fingerprint can be deduced for a work by calculating the ‘Manhattan distance’ between the
multi-dimensional  plots  of  the  z-scored  word  frequencies  of  texts.5 It  is  not  surprising  that
mathematics, as a self-referential formal system of representation, is able to represent language, a
self-referential formal system of representation, within its own logics.
Scholarly debate around computer-generated poetry stretches back to the 1970s when it was
frequently invoked in debates on author intentionality.6 Did it matter, commentators asked, whether
a poem was written by a human or a machine in the age of poststructuralist readings? It was also
clear  at  this  time  that  applications  of  humanities  computing  (the  precursor  term  for  ‘digital
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humanities’) existed for the study and teaching of poetry, which at least one contemporary found
‘analogous’ to hypertext.7 Most importantly, though, ‘poetry’ written by computers is usually found
to be lacking an author. For instance, P.D. Juhl claims that when we read machine-written poetry
‘we are not dealing with anyone’s use of the words’, although he concedes that the words may
‘possibly’  be ‘the programmer’s’.8 Even the most recent comprehensive surveys of computational
poetics continue to note that this authorial deletion lies at the heart of machine-authored poetry:
‘contemporary technology radically challenges the creative process of poetry authorship’.9
What is most significant here, though, is that the roots of academic concern about computer-
written poetry are far less materialist than those in the popular imagination. For ‘it is important’,
writes David Johnston, ‘that poets (and not technologists/linguists) interrogate what the practice of
poetry is  in  a  big data/cloud world’,  a re-inscription of  the poet  as  a  valid  and distinct  labour
specialist at the heart of such an enterprise but framed in terms of sentiment and taste.10 Certainly, to
return  to  Dahl,  the  ‘Great  Automatic  Grammatizator’ gives  us  a  sense  that  what  is  lost  to  the
machine is art-for-art’s sake, the ‘creative urge’.11 Yet markets and business saturate the story; it is
all about the  labour and remuneration of writing and publishing. Of course, Dahl’s satire is not
actually about computer writing. Despite the predictable nature of Dahl’s own brand of shock-twist
short story, ‘The Great Automatic Grammatizator’ is instead aimed at formulaic genre fiction that is
decried as the output of older writers who have ‘run out of ideas’ but who comprise ‘seventy per
cent’ of the work accepted by publishers.12 In turn, this feels akin to John W. Aldridge's formulation
of an ‘assembly-line fiction’; for Dahl’s protagonist,  Adolph Knipe, is surely a swipe at  Alfred
Knopf, the publisher of Someone Like You but who would also later drop Dahl in 1981.13
That Dahl’s target is not truly computational writing does not mean, though, that there is
nothing to say about the conjunction of publisher markets and machine prose to which Dahl draws
attention. Instead, I will here go on to argue, the fundamental crux that we continue to elide in the
space of electronic literature and machine writing is the locus of different labour functions that
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underwrite their production, reception, circulation, and preservation. For the digital space is often
imagined as infinitely abundant. The ability to copy any extant artefact at a near-infinitesimal cost
leads the digital imagination to perceive of limitations of labour as a technical, rather than a social,
problem. In fact, digital abundance rests upon scarce material labour and requires additional forms
of technical  expertise  to  develop and maintain electronic infrastructures.  The ability  to  harness
abundant digital potentialities is restricted by an underlying material economy. In this way, I argue,
the  digital  space  provides  us  with  a  new  commodity  fetishism,  in  which  we  focus  upon  our
technical relationships with the digital prostheses with which we all now write, instead of our labour
relationships between people that underwrite such technologies.
What I am interested in here addressing, then, is the question that comes out of the work of
Jerome McGann in his writing on the information age.14 If the work of literature is a social text, or
event, then what forms of labour are invested in the technological tool chains that contribute to its
creation but that often lie unrecognised by our contemporary systems of authorship? I want to push
the question asked by McGann – ‘where is information technology driving literary and cultural
studies’?15 – to its limit by asking what labour underpins such a textual socialisation when, in the
current age of books in the making, we believe that computers can write.
Writing Like Someone Like You
What  does  it  actually  mean  to  say  that  computers  can  write?  What  are  the  labour  forms  that
underpin  such  authorship?  The  metaphor  of  ‘writing’ certainly  runs  throughout  computational
terminology. Forms of computer storage, from processor registers through random access memory
to solid state and hard drives, are ‘read’ and ‘written’ via minute physical magnetic manipulations
and reflections. Computational media are deemed read- or write-protected in some instances. Yet
this  metaphor is not the type of writing of which we speak when we claim that computational
writing is on the rise. This metaphorical reading and writing of physical media in a computational
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environment is more akin to a type of microscopic palm reading where a claimed expert can sense
that which is hidden to the untrained human eye. Yet even this metaphor is not strictly accurate; to
comprehend fully computational writing and reading in this mode would require a sort of ‘alien
phenomenology’ of the kind detailed by Ian Bogost.16
However, most authors are also now used to writing with computers, albeit not quite in the
way  that  Dahl  imagined.  The  process  of  fabricating  the  material  codex  has  been  digitally
intermediated for many years now.17 Even those contemporary authors – those Don DeLillos and
Jennifer Egans – who cling to typewriters and pens and paper will have their words re-wrought into
various digital forms by others in an often-gendered division of labour.18 
Yet what we talk about when we talk about computational writing is the production of text
that appears as though it was generated directly and immediately by humans even while this is not
the case. That is, the precise selection of sequential words was decided neither by an individual
person nor by that individual working in conjunction with an editor or co-authors. As with so-called
‘artificial intelligence’, the benchmark of success is the exact mimicry, or even out-performance, of
human  characteristics  of  intelligence.  This  is  to  say  that  ideas  of  artificial  intelligence  and
computational writing are saturated with anthropocentric thought. In order to succeed, attempts at
producing artificial  intelligence and computational writing must,  therefore,  strive to transcend a
mechanistic logic through a type of incomprehensibility; a free will or vitalism should animate the
process and produce work that is indistinguishable (by humans) from those created by a human
imagination.  Yet  the  criteria  for  success  at  computer  writing  sit  on  a  spectrum of  evaluation.
Computers can write badly or they can strive to pass Turing tests, but in both cases the computer is
‘writing’.
This in-built quest for computationalised human mimicry can be seen in many works of
contemporary electronic literature, such as Johannes Heldén & Håkan Jonson’s  Evolution [2014].
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Evolution, the winner of the inaugural N. Katherine Hayles Prize, is described by its creators as ‘a
Java-based AI application that emulates the writing and compositions of poet and artist Johannes
Heldén. The application analyzes a database with all published text- and soundwork by the artist
and  generates  a  continuously  evolving  poem that  simulates  Heldén’s  style:  in  vocabulary,  the
spacing in-between words,  syntax,  sound’.  The artwork,  we are told,  has  ‘the ultimate  goal  of
passing “The Imitation Game Test” as proposed by Alan Turing in 1951’ and its release ‘will mark
the end of Johannes Heldén writing poetry books. He has, in a sense, been replaced’.19 Thus, the
final biological aspiration of this computational work is integral to its titular Darwinian resonance.
We  are  left  in  no  doubt  that  Evolution  seeks  to  be  the  fittest  and  to  out-survive  its  human
progenitors.
Figure 1: A run of Evolution at generation 554
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Evolution, though, also aspires to a type of print bookishness, a material textuality in a digital space.
For while Evolution is not called a ‘book’ by its creators (it is referred to as an ‘application’ and an
‘online artwork-in-progress’), it has been assigned an ISBN and further appears in an extremely
limited print form. The web page itself on which the software is displayed is styled in the guise of a
codex that even incorporates a page-staining effect (or a de-generation).
By way of  compositional  analysis,  Evolution’s  codebase consists  of  two components:  a
front-facing HTML and Javascript library that controls the playback and a back-end server-based
component.  The frontend fetches a  set  of formatting and music playback instructions  from the
server.  The server returns information about 100 ‘generations’ at  a time and is accessed by the
Javascript client at locations on the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud.20 Each set of generations is
grouped under a string of text that serves as a ‘sequence’ identifier for random seed data, which
range from ‘cups of coffee per episode of twin peaks’ through to ‘atlas of extratropical storm tracks
(1961-1998)’.  A generation itself  is  composed of a set  of instructions encoded in a JSON data
format:   for example,  ‘{"word":"night","age":2577,"index":9,"delta":false}’,.21 These instructions
are  created  by  a  server-side  application  that  deploys  an  evolutionary  algorithmic  strategy  for
stochastic  text  selection – another  reason for the piece’s  name – based on the work of Andrei
Markov and Ingo Rechenberg and selected by ‘a semi-deterministic random seed […] derived from
atmospheric data, visual imagery, space observations and popular culture’.22
Evolution  is, in some ways, just the latest version of a form that overlaps with concrete
poetry and that Bronaċ Ferran, following Haroldo de Campos, has dubbed ‘typoetical’, emanating
from the print-publisher networks of Hansjörg Mayer, Max Bense, and Dieter Roth among others
over the past six decades.23 This form incorporates iterative process, overlay, and spatial layout as
key to its composition, strongly resonating with various algorithmic Oulipo techniques. This model
has also been called ‘kinetic poetry’ by Christopher Funkhouser, a mode in which ‘images can be a
mélange of fragments of words complemented or replaced by imagistic forms’.24
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Let us be clear, though: Evolution is not going to pass a Turing test any time soon. In fact,
Evolution is not even going to pass itself off as a substitute for Heldén’s own poetry. While it may
be true that its computational processes result in an ur-version of Heldén’s poetics, this ur-version
lacks the specificity  and coherence of his  earlier  work,  as in the 2013  Terraforming.  For even
radical poetry is rarely stochastic. Evolution represents, then, an abstraction of the mathematics of
language – as Dahl prophesied – but its techniques do not countenance linguistic sense in the way
that Heldén does when he writes. Evolution may yield a semantically empty mathematical average
of Heldén’s poetry, his layout, and his musical essence but it also points, I will argue, to a set of
infrastructures and labours that are its own conditions of possibility.
Before turning back to this core of my argument, I want to move to a second example at the
bleeding edge of human language emulation: character-based recurrent neural networks (RNNs).
Recurrent neural networks are software simulations of biological neurons, in which many small
processing units are passed the output from other ‘neurons’, all of which have a memory of input
that they have processed before and which they use to modify their output. In short, the machine
adapts by passing output from its different processing units as input back in to itself. Character-
based recurrent neural networks take text as input and build a statistical matrix of the most-likely
next character in any sequence. Unlike teaching a human to read or write, this approach does not
focus on words but rather on single characters and their statistical likelihood of occurring in any
sequence run. Also unlike teaching a human, character-based recurrent neural networks that are not
run on high-performance computing hardware have only a limited number of neurons, somewhat
more akin to the capacity of a worm than a person.
How well can a worm write when it is taught to predict characters?25 Over a twenty-four
hour period, I trained a torch-rnn model using the entire corpus (until 2016) of the literary studies
journal Textual Practice and then sampled 5,000-character chunks from its saved checkpoints.26 The
machine  learned to  produce  text  that  certainly  feels  emblematic  of  the  journal  and that  might
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unnerve  others  in  its  uncanny  proximity  to  Alan  Sokal's  1996  faux-pomo  prose  (‘faux-mo’,
perhaps?).27 It  told  me that  ‘the  series  of  temporal  inventions  of  the  object  is  intelligible  only
afterwards’ but that ‘in the early twentieth century, these recognitions are contingent’. In one of its
more poetic moments, the network claimed that ‘the world was right to have to introduce its choice:
that meaning was a palimpsestuous scholarship, the literary moment’.
Without  any knowledge of the English language,  the network also became proficient  at
generating bibliographic and footnote items, including ‘Slavoj Žižek,  Live Fiction, trans. Rushdie
and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Bohestock Press, 1994)’; ‘John Spottisley, ‘The privatized climax’.
(1929), p. 4, emphasis in original’; and the instruction to ‘see David Pillar, New Bibliography, ed.
Donald  Davis  (London:  Lawrence  &  Wishart,  1979)’.  The  network  learned  the  capitalization
structure of English proper nouns, the formatting of references, common names, publishers and date
structures, and the likely labour functions of editors and translators. This was all achieved simply
through probabilistic modelling of the character sequences already present within Textual Practice,
using fewer processing units than those inside the neural system of a nematode.
Of course, even when it accidentally distils nuggets of truth, the network has no motivation
towards communication and no epistemological goal except to achieve ever-more perfection in its
stylistic mimicry of the articles in Textual Practice. As it noted in one of my samplings, in a remark
that could apply well to itself, ‘I shall ﬁnd our intellectual values, by rewriting their very ties’. For
the machine is one of pure textual practice; even while it knows to include footnotes, its references
are dead ends and subversions of traditional academic epistemologies.28 They ‘provide the fraud of
the epistemological practices of knowledge’;  another generation of the network.  Taken together
with the faux aesthetics of  Evolution,  these two models of linguistic aping contain within them
contradictory logics of artificial intelligence that continually point to social labour. ‘The problem’,
as the network aptly phrased it, ‘is that the poem is a construction of the self as a strategy of self-
consciousness and context’.
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Textual Practice as Social Undertaking
Digital  literary  aesthetics  presuppose  human readers  encountering  works  after  their  production,
although we can also imagine outputs directed solely at computational systems, much as in the
intermediate feedback stage of directed cycle neural networks. That is, their existence presupposes,
as  Alan  Liu  put  it,  ‘a  scene  of  encounters’.29 Indeed,  the  dynamic  temporal  inventions  of  the
machine are intelligible only afterwards to a human reader. Yet where is the line in textual creation
between the machine as tool and the machine as author?
As of 2017 we have already witnessed the rise of  computer-generated business and sports
journalism.30 The formalised, highly generic prose style of this work – similar to that at which Dahl
directed his ire– lends itself to repetitious statistical natural language generation. (There is in itself
another article to be written about the evolution of the term "natural language generator" as opposed
to "artificial neural network" and the ongoing erosion of this artificial/natural binary when both
systems are underwritten by people as naturecultures.) Small-scale studies have even demonstrated
that human audiences are unable to discriminate between this machine-written prose and articles
written by people.31 In this  case,  adjusting sentiment sliders much as Dahl imagined,  statistical
reporting  on  the  stock  market  and  soccer  games  can  be  automatically  churned  out  for  mass
consumption.
Admittedly, there is something alarming in such a trend; it feels connected to a decentring of
the human in the production of written language.  Yet companies such as ‘Narrative Science’ –
corporate specialists in this field – claim that their job lies in ‘humanizing data like never before,
with technology that interprets your data’, and that ‘then transforms it into Intelligent Narratives at
unprecedented speed and scale’. That is, the organization paradoxically seeks to humanize through a
chiastic  mode  of  mechanization.  Their  software  also,  clearly,  requires  human  calibration  and
operation.
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The profusion of the concept of ‘narrative’ beyond the walls of academic literary criticism –
and as nothing less than an apparent ‘science’ – is alarming. It undoubtedly cedes what literary
critics and journalists, among other groups, have known for many years: that narrative possesses a
power worthy of study. In its corporate excess and buzz-speak, this movement also gestures towards
the large-scale population-manipulation through narrative that is a feature of most contemporary
news  media  and  that  undoubtedly  played  a  role  in  the  ascent  of  democratically  elected  neo-
authoritarians  around  2016.  At  the  same  time,  though,  in  its  utilitarian  mobilisation  through
companies  such  as  Narrative  Science,  there  are  other  worrying  aspects  to  this  growth  of
computational narrative. These anxieties can be grouped under two headings: first, as a means of
eradicating or re-situating labour through mechanisation; and second, in its dividing naturalisation
of  a  realm  of  scientific  data,  that  apparently  sit  apart  from  narrative  (as  though  scientific
hermeneutics  were  not,  themselves,  an  interpretation  and  narrativization),  opposed  to  a
‘humanized’, narrative version of those data.
However, on this second point, we might also ask what the difference is between such a
piece of guided ‘helper’ software and the existing systems of word processing that are in broad
circulation. Is the use of an automated spellchecker a machine writing? It certainly changes the
word that an author may have typed. What about a thesaurus that suggests wholly different words?
Grammatical checking that alters sentence structure? My word processor, LibreOffice Writer, even
provides automatic completions for words based on the characters that I begin to type, conditioning
future possibilities through suggestion. As William Winder has put it, ‘formatters, spell checkers,
thesauri,  grammar  checkers,  and  personal  printers  support  our  writing  almost silently’.32 For
Winder, the question comes down to whether, in our use of such prostheses, computers are ‘typists
or writers’.33 Or, put otherwise: is the Great Automatic Grammatizator different by type or degree
from other forms of writing aid? We certainly find that ‘our machines are disturbingly lively, and
we ourselves frighteningly inert’, as Donna Haraway put it many years ago.34
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Evolution implies, by its very title and mission statement, that its efforts are in competition
with human writers and are on the same plane. As a survival of the fittest comes into play, the piece
proclaims, the human author will stop writing poetry and the machine will take over; a process of
unnatural  selection  or  ‘uncreative  writing’,  to  quote  Kenneth  Goldsmith.35 Likewise,  injecting
structural flow components into the decision-making portions of recurrent neural networks would
allow argumentative progression, overcoming many of the claimed objections about computational
mastery of narrative form. Yet, by their respective modelling on the works of Heldén and by their
directed  cyclical  structures  for  training,  these models  of  language and aesthetics  are  inherently
conservative. Of course, even in human writing there is an interplay between the individual talent (a
progressive randomness) and traditions (a conservatism). It is often also frequently argued that there
is nothing new under the sun and that all writing is a working through of permutations of a grand set
of master narratives, an almost Kabbalistic approach to permuting the name of God. This inward-
looking  approach  to  language  generation  by  people  is,  further,  clearly  reflected  in  my  neural
network’s accidental pronouncement that the poem is a construction of the self as a strategy of self-
consciousness and context.  The self  that it  uses, in this  case,  is an aggregate of human selves.
Whether or not it has such a self-consciousness, though, is a different matter. However, the absolute
history of computer writing rests upon this human writing and labour. Were the human race to die
out but the machines to keep on writing, they would continue to produce ever-more conservative
texts, training themselves upon their own regurgitated outputs with only semi-deterministic random
seeds to aid progress and foster change.
Of course, were the human race to die out and the machines to continue writing, this would
be  a  remarkable  occurrence.  This  is  because  of  the  vast  infrastructures  that  underpin  our
technologies  and  the  substantial  volumes  of  labour  that  are  necessary  for  their  perpetuation.
Evolution  gestures towards this challenge of digital preservation in a post-human (in the sense of
‘after human’) era. Its ‘pages’ are stained as though the digital fabric has been damaged by light
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exposure, thereby calling attention to the enormous global technologies of preservation that we have
constructed for the retention of print: libraries. However, because this aspect sits within a digital
framework, it also calls attention to matters of digital preservation.
Digital preservation is a good space within which to examine such issues of labour since it is
dogged by a series of challenges that are, at core, all social rather than technical. Given infinite
resources it would be possible to preserve the vast majority of digital artefacts produced today.
However, we are not given infinite resources. There is a scarcity of remuneration available within
our systems of economic exchange that itself causes a cascade of other problems. For instance, if
we cannot preserve everything because we have insufficient resources, how do we decide where to
invest our preservation efforts, given that our abilities to forecast value fare extremely poorly under
experimental conditions?36 This is exemplary of the core difficulty of scarcity against abundance in
the digital space. The ability to copy infinitely leads to the belief that virtual environments are ripe
for proliferation, be that in file formats or volume of material. Yet without underlying remuneration
for human labour, there is a problem in the long-term retention and ability to access or execute
arbitrary binary data.
Works like  Evolution  gesture towards this problem. For, on the one hand,  Evolution  is an
artwork about proliferation, as is the natural language generation of the recurrent neural network.
Both  programs  promise  ever-evolving  sets  of  textual  permutations,  offering  an  abundance  of
inscription.  Yet, conversely,  both programs also rest  upon vast quantities of computer scientific
research. They both require infrastructures of material production to manufacture silicon chips, to
run power facilities,  to  educate  their  operators,  to  debug their  software,  and so on.  Evolution’s
infrastructure even requires Amazon’s hosting facilities for its server components. That is, it relies
upon what is both the greatest ‘virtualizer’ but also the most miraculous materializer that the world
has seen in recent years. With the click of a virtual button at Amazon, it seems, objects appear in the
mailbox. Yet we also know that Amazon works only by drawing upon vast reservoirs of poorly paid
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warehouse  staff  and by pricing  its  artefacts  as  cheaply  as  possible  in  order  to  achieve  market
domination even while  not  turning a  profit.  In other  words,  a  material  scarcity  underpins  such
infrastructures.  This  dichotomy  is  also  apparent  in  the  structure  of  Evolution.  For  the  work’s
algorithms run not on text alone but on text and whitespace, on abundance and scarcity.37
Indeed, Evolution samples not only the words of the poet that it is meant to replace, but also
the blanks. Like music,  which always includes silence with sound,  Evolution  continually points
towards the importance of emptiness. In fact, the blankness and space – that is, of course, not really
blank, but actually a falsely stained ‘page’, thereby drawing attention to its own quasi-absence –
that sit behind the text are metaphorically indicative of the very problem that I am attempting to
draw out. Even while the space of computational writing is seen as one of proliferation (‘computers
can write!’)  it  remains bound to a scarcity – a blankness in recognition – of labour forms that
underwrite  its  possibilities.  The print  volume of  Evolution  pushes  this  even further,  oscillating
between black background and white foreground for computer code against ‘human’ exegesis with
a white background and black text (the data component of Evolution's print book is presented with a
white background and black foreground). Yet even this binary reduction to a black-and-white print
format contains within it the seeds of a material critique: that print economics can determine, shape,
and limit the contrasts of form that are available to poets, be they computational or human.
That we continue to refer to computer poetry and literature as lacking an author seems,
therefore, somewhat strange. Many labour forms were as integral to its creation as the above listed
labours will be to its preservation. Yet at what point between the spellchecker and the recurrent
neural network does the author disappear? The question cannot be boiled down to a percentage of
the labour involved; it is conceivable that a text could be written in which the spellchecker was used
to correct every single term but still we would not give a byline to the author of the software. There
are also historical  precedents  for this  division between the labour of manufacturing the tool as
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opposed to  the  output.  Thoreau,  certainly,  did  not  fully  credit  his  own family’s  pencil-making
industry in the authorship of Walden. Yet the pencil is an ‘advanced technology’.38
Academic publishing has also encountered the dilemma of representing labour, even while
efforts continue to use computers to mine papers at high volume (‘distant-reading’).39 High-energy
physics  experiments  such  as  those  conducted  at  the  Large  Hadron  Collider  or  the  Laser
Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory require diverse types of labour forms in order to
conduct their work. However, since academic systems of hiring, promotion, and tenure are geared
towards authorship of research outputs as their primary measure, we arrive at the somewhat curious
state  of papers  with over 5,000 authors,  as in  the case of the recent  Higgs Boson experiment,
credited to G. Aad  et al.  (where listing the ‘et al.’ consumes twenty-four pages of the article’s
thirty-three-page total).40
What is further remarkable about the increasing accomplishments of computational writing
prostheses  is  that  their  success  at  imitating  human  writing  leads  to  an  imagination  of  a  post-
anthropocentric era.  There is  a  temporality of ‘afterwardness’ inherent in computational natural
language processing and generation. That is, in achieving a mimesis of human writing – remember,
a measure of intelligence formed only by anthropocentric reference to the human – computational
writing asks us to imagine a world in which there are no more humans undertaking such labour.
Such thinking only emerges, though, in the imagined substitution of the human with human-like
automata. This imagined afterwards world is both a post-anthropocentric world for writers and a
world in which a writing machine that is legitimated by human-like characteristics is inscribed at
the centre. It is concurrently an imagined world in which we have no benchmark of contemporary
writing success but one that is nonetheless dominated by machines that meet that nostalgic target.
What, then, of the Great Automatic Grammatizator? Have our hands already crept to the
other side of the desk, seeking to avoid the starvation of our children? Are our brands – those
hollow outlines of action – all  that is left  when our labours are consigned to the technological
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dustbins of history? Can you identify which portions of this article should be attributed to me and
which portions to the artificial neural network and, hence, to the software authors in some mediated
sense? The words from the network do not all appear in quotation marks. Or should we instead be
more concerned that we seem unwilling to represent the vast quantities of human labour that have
already been invested in the creation of our technological writing prostheses? Ever more frequently,
vast volumes of computational labour – programming, infrastructure, and communications labours
– underpin our social textual production. As we do not credit them now, I would like to ask what
meagre credit  for our authorial  inputs  we can expect  once the literary market  has fallen under
Knipe’s malign influence?
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